On the legal regulation of cut-throat competition within e-commerce platforms
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.63313/SSH.9060Keywords:
Coe-commerce platform, cut-throat competition, Anti-Unfair Competition Law, Anti-Monopoly Law, legal regulation, platform governanceAbstract
China's e-commerce industry enters an era of competition within existing markets, the dividend from traffic is gradually diminishing, and the space for external market expansion is increasingly limited. In order to compete for limited user resources and market share, various e-commerce platforms are gradually aban-doning the healthy competition model centered on technological innovation and differentiated services, and instead falling into a typical form of involutionary competition characterized by low-price dumping, false advertising, big data price discrimination, and "choose one or the other" exclusive transactions. Such com-petitive behaviors not only seriously disrupt the order of fair competition in the market and inhibit the overall innovation vitality of the industry, but also directly infringe upon the legitimate rights and interests of consumers, squeezing the liv-ing and development space of small and medium-sized operators and emerging platforms, ultimately leading to a vicious cycle of "bad money driving out good money." This paper uses the Anti-Unfair Competition Law and the Anti-Monopoly Law as core legal analysis tools. It first defines the connotation of involutionary competition within e-commerce platforms, systematically sorts out its behavioral patterns and multi-level social harms. Then, it deeply analyzes the practical di-lemmas faced by the current legal system in regulating such competition, such as vague behavioral characterization, difficulties in determining market dominance, light legal liability settings, and insufficient coordination between law enforce-ment and judiciary. Finally, from multiple dimensions including legislative coor-dination refinement, innovation in law enforcement mechanisms, strengthening of judicial protection, and supplement of industry self-discipline, this paper pro-poses a path to build a systematic, professional, and dynamic governance system for e-commerce competition. The study believes that to address involutionary competition within e-commerce platforms, it is necessary to transcend the limi-tations of a single legal department or law enforcement means, promote the con-nection and coordination within the competition law system and with other market regulatory laws, strengthen data-driven regulatory capabilities, and fully leverage the rule-guiding role of judicial judgments, thereby effectively curbing irrational competition on platforms, maintaining a healthy and orderly digital market ecosystem, and promoting the e-commerce industry to achieve high-quality development driven by innovation.
References
[1] Guo Wei, Li Zehao. (2025) Involutionary Competition: Connotation, Causes and Governance. Theoretical Exploration, 1, 1-8.
[2] Wei Xiang, Wu Di, Wang Xinli. (2025) Involutionary Competition and Its Price Effect in E-commerce Platforms - A Case Study from Large Tourism E-commerce Platforms. Price Theory and Practice, 2, 25-30.
[3] Liu Ke, Huang Bochen. (2023) Legal Liability and Regulatory Logic of Actors Involved in E-commerce Live Streaming for Product Promotion. Jianghan Forum, 10, 139-144.
[4] Huo Meini. (2021) Analysis of the Illegality of "Either-Or" Behavior in E-commerce Platforms. Southern Finance, 5, 89-99.
[5] Wang Xianlin. (2021) Trends, Challenges, and Countermeasures of Antitrust in the Platform Economy. Jurisprudential Forum, 2021, 2, 5-15.
[6] Shi Jianzhong. (2020) An Analysis of the Common Market Dominance System. China Legal Science, 3, 222-241.Wu, J.K. (1994) Two Problems of Computer Mechanics Program System. Proceedings of Finite Element Analysis and CAD, Peking University Press, Beijing, 9-15.
[7] Zhang Chenyin. (2021) Macro Positioning and Implementation Path of Antitrust in Platform Economy. Economic and Trade Law Review, 1, 1-17.
[8] Zhong Chun. (2020) The Antitrust Regulation Path of Algorithmic Collusion. Eastern Law Review, 6, 84-95.
Downloads
Published
Issue
Section
License
Copyright (c) 2026 by author(s) and Erytis Publishing Limited.

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.













